Posted by Lani Estepa on Tuesday, March 23rd, 2010 at 8:48 pm

    (I have been following the series of articles abridged below. They are very revealing and enlightening. The author explicitly enjoins readers to repost, but I have opted not to include the photos. The original post is here.)

    In the Philippines and abroad, the name Aquino is linked with democracy and justice. Ninoy Aquino’s death led to the end of the Marcos dictatorship. After the fall of Marcos, Cory Cojuangco-Aquino was to be the new hope of the country, a leader who truly cared for the people.

    Unfortunately, this picture is not entirely correct.

    The Cojuangco-Aquino family has been running an estate of 6,453 hectares, Hacienda Luisita, since they bought it in 1958. Jose Cojuangco Sr., Cory’s father, received large loans to buy the hacienda, on the condition that it would be distributed to the farmers by 1967.

    Now, 43 years later, the land has still not been distributed. There has never been any valid reason why this was not done and many people have been killed for demanding justice.

    This article tells the story of Hacienda Luisita and shows the darker side of Cory, her son Noynoy and the rest of the Cojuangco-Aquino family.

    NOTE

    This is a summary of a series of well-researched articles by Stephanie Dychiu, published on GMANews.TV Special Reports. The goal of this article is to make the truth available to busy people and to the general public, including people with a basic knowledge of English. We also hope to make this article available in Tagalog.

    If you have the time, please also read the original articles on GMANews.TV. The links are at the end of this article.

    THE SPIRIT OF LAND REFORM

    When Spain colonized the Philippines, it claimed its lands and forced the natives to work and pay taxes to Spanish landlords.

    Land reform is about giving back the stolen lands to the farmers, whose ancestors had been tilling the land for centuries.

    HACIENDA LUISITA’S EARLY YEARS

    The land that is now Hacienda Luisita was awarded by the Spanish government to a Spanish company called Tabacalera in 1882. Tabacalera built a sugar mill in the hacienda in 1927.

    In 1958, Tabacalera sold the hacienda and its sugar mill to the Cojuangco family.

    LOANS AND CONDITIONS

    To be able to buy the hacienda and its sugar mill, Jose Cojuangco Sr., Cory Aquino’s father, applied for a loan from the GSIS and from a New York bank.

    The GSIS loan was approved on the condition that the hacienda would be distributed among its tenants.

    The other loan was granted because the Central Bank of the Philippines (BSP) deposited part of the country’s international reserves with the New York bank. BSP did this on the condition that the land would be distributed to the farmers by 1967.

    LAND NOT DISTRIBUTED TO FARMERS

    1967 passed with no distribution taking place.

    The government asked the Cojuangcos several times to distribute the land. Each time, the Cojuangcos’ response was: They could not distribute the land because there were no tenants on the hacienda.

    In 1980, the Marcos government filed a case against the Cojuangcos. Five years later, the Manila Regional Trial Court ordered the Cojuangcos to sell Hacienda Luisita to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform so that it could be distributed to the farmers.

    The Cojuangcos appealed against the court’s decision.

    CORY’S PROMISE

    During Cory’s election campaign, she and her family promised that if she became president, the hacienda would be distributed to the farmers.

    Cory said, “Land-to-the-tiller must become a reality, instead of an empty slogan…. You will probably ask me: Will I also apply it to my family’s Hacienda Luisita? My answer is yes.”

    CORY COMES TO POWER

    In February 1986, Cory became president and Salvador “Doy” Laurel became prime minister.

    A month later, Cory abolished the 1973 Constitution, the Parliament and Laurel’s position as Prime Minister, and took over the law-making branch of the government.

    THE MENDIOLA MASSACRE

    Almost a year after Cory became president, the hacienda had still not been distributed to the farmers.

    Because of this, thousands of frustrated farmers went to Malacañang in January 1987 to demand land distribution. The police fired on the protesters, killing 13 and injuring 51.

    CORY’S LAND REFORM LAW

    In May 1988, Cory dismissed the 1980 Marcos government case against the Cojuangcos.

    A month later, Cory signed her land reform law.

    The law included an option, which allowed land owners to give farmers partial ownership of a company instead of distributing the land. In other words, the farmers would receive shares of stock instead of land.

    SHARES INSTEAD OF LAND

    The Cojuangcos used the option to distribute shares instead of land. They said it was impractical to divide the hacienda’s 4,916 hectares of agricultural land among 6,296 farmers, as each farmer would receive only 0.78 hectares.

    But according to a National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) study, the farmers could still earn more with 0.78 hectares of land each than with shares. And if dividing the land was impractical, the farmers had the option of forming a cooperative.

    COMPANY FORMED BEFORE VOTE

    In 1989, Luisita’s farmers were asked to choose between shares and land. More than 90% voted for shares.

    But as early as August 1988, the Cojuangcos had already created the company that they would use to avoid actual land distribution. This aroused suspicion that the stock distribution option had already been decided before it was voted on.

    UNFAIR DISTRIBUTION OF SHARES

    Hacienda Luisita Inc., the company created by the Cojuangcos, was 33% owned by the farmers and 67% owned by the Cojuangcos. The division was based on the capital the two groups put into the company.

    4,916 hectares of land, which was valued at P197 million, or P40,000 per hectare, was considered the farmers’ capital.

    Non-land assets, which were valued at P394 million, were considered the Cojuangcos’ capital.

    (P197 million is 33% of the total capital, while P394 million is 67% of the total capital.)

    67% ownership meant that the Cojuangcos would still have full control of the company.

    The problem is, there is something wrong with those numbers. Many things that were included in the Cojuangcos’ capital should have been included in the farmers’ capital. The most important of these things were:

    1. Crops valued at P103 million.

    2. Part of the land worth P28 million, which was transferred from Hacienda Luisita Inc. to its sugar mill.

    3. 121 hectares of “residential land,” which was valued at P60 million, or P500,000 per hectare. (The year before, this was valued at only P55,000 per hectare.)

    4. 266 hectares of “land improvements,” which were valued at P58 million, or P219,000 per hectare. (The year before, these were valued at only P21,000 per hectare.)

    If the above items had been counted as farmers’ capital, the company would have been 75% owned by the farmers and 25% owned by the Cojuangcos.

    30-YEAR WAITING PERIOD

    To make things worse, the 33% ownership would not be given to the farmers in 1989. Instead, it would be given over a period of 30 years. The farmers would receive only 1/30 of their shares at the end of each year.

    Also, the distribution of shares would be based on the number of days the farmers worked. This means that if a farmer quits or was fired, he or she would stop receiving shares. If the number of working days was reduced, the number of shares distributed for that year would also be reduced.

    This arrangement was illegal. According to the law, the shares should be distributed within 60 days of the implementation of the stock distribution option.

    MASTER PLAN TO CONVERT LAND

    In 1998, the Cojuangcos developed a master plan to convert the hacienda’s agricultural land into commercial, industrial and residential lands. The farmers began to fear for their jobs.

    FARMERS’ PETITION

    In 2003, the farmers’ wage went down to P9.50 per day after deductions. Working days went down to 1 per week.

    The farmers filed a petition to cancel the stock distribution option and stop land conversion. They also asked for a wage increase and an increase in working days. But the Cojuangcos said no.

    In October 2004, the Cojuangcos fired 327 farm workers, including union officers.

    FARMERS GO ON STRIKE

    On November 6, 2004, the union of farm workers (United Luisita Workers Union or ULWU) launched a picket and blocked Gate 1 of the sugar mill.

    They were joined by the union of sugar mill workers (Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union or CATLU), who blocked Gate 2 of the sugar mill.

    The Philippine National Police (PNP) were called in. The police used tear gas, batons and water cannons but they were unable to stop the strike.

    Four days after the strike started, the strikers were ordered by the government to leave within five days, or else they would be removed by force.

    The strikers did not leave. They called for help. People from the barrios around Luisita, including priests, barangay officials and children, came to protect them.

    On November 15, the PNP returned with around 400 policemen. But they were still unable to stop the strike.

    THE LUISITA MASSACRE

    The next day, 700 policemen, 17 trucks of soldiers in full battle gear, at least 5 snipers, 2 tanks equipped with heavy weapons, a large tractor and 4 fire trucks with water cannons came to Luisita. The military and the police attacked the protesters with tear gas and water mixed with chemicals from the fire trucks. The protesters fought back by shooting the fire trucks and tanks with slingshots.

    Then, gunshots were heard. The military and the police fired on the men, women and children as they ran for their lives. Some protesters were beaten and dragged into army trucks. Some were shot while running, crouching or lying down.

    1,000 rounds of ammunition were used by the military and the police during the shooting. Seven protesters were killed and at least 121 were injured. Of the 121 injured, 32 suffered gunshot wounds, 11 were children and teenagers, and 4 were over 60 years old.

    NOYNOY DEFENDS MILITARY AND POLICE ACTION

    The day after the massacre, Noynoy Aquino said the strike was illegal. He defended the military and the police’s dispersal of the protesters. He said the military and the police were attacked by sniper fire coming from a neighboring barangay. He said the riot was started by outsiders.

    On the same day, Noynoy said the protesters fired first. He said when the police tried to break the barricade using an armored personnel carrier, they were fired upon by the protesters.

    Noynoy also told some congressmen not to investigate what had happened as it could worsen the situation.

    Noynoy’s statements were proven false by the strikers and the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), which investigated the situation.

    UNION’S OFFICE DESTROYED

    Days after the massacre, the union’s office was destroyed by soldiers.

    “Nung balikan namin ang opisina namin, wala na lahat. Ultimo ang computer na gamit namin, giba-giba na. Yung mga file, lahat, wala na kaming inabutan. (When we went back to our office, everything was gone. Even the computer we were using was totally destroyed. Our files, everything, we were not able to save anything),” said Lito Bais, a leader of the United Luisita Workers Union.

    NOYNOY’S ESCORTS TAGGED IN SHOOTING

    On January 5, 2005, farm workers George Loveland and Ernesto Ramos were shot. Both survived, but suffered serious gunshot wounds to the chest and stomach.

    In his testimony, Loveland said the shooters were plain-clothes security men who were with Noynoy three days before the shooting. The words used by Loveland to describe the men were: “mga bata ni Noynoy Aquino,” “mga private army ni Congressman (Noynoy),” and “parang security guard, parang bodyguard.”

    The day before the shooting, Loveland was told by one of the shooters that the farm workers should agree to the construction of a road.

    Noynoy declined to be interviewed about the incident and did not answer the questions that were sent to him.

    NOYNOY’S “SUPERHIGHWAY”

    In his testimony, Loveland said that on January 2, 2005, Noynoy talked to the farm workers about the “superhighway.”

    Loveland: Sinasabi niya po yung hinihingi daw po niyang pabor yung sa superhighway na hinihingi niya… (He was talking about a favor for the superhighway that he was asking for…)
    Sen. Osmeña: Ano tungkol sa superhighway? (What about the superhighway?)
    Loveland: Project niya daw po, sir… (He said it was his project… )
    Sen. Osmeña: Ano ang hiningi ni Congressman Aquino? (What did Congressman Aquino ask for?)
    Loveland: Yung ipatupad, sir, yung kuwan expressway, sir. (To let it happen, sir, the expressway, sir.)

    Loveland was referring to the Luisita interchange of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEx).

    The farmers protested against the construction of the road because it would lead to the loss of a large area of the hacienda’s agricultural land.

    SCTEX INVESTIGATION

    In November 2009, an investigation into the SCTEx project was launched.

    Cavite Rep. Crispin Remulla said Noynoy lobbied for the Luisita interchange. Remulla also raised the following issues:

    1. The government paid Hacienda Luisita Inc. P83 million for the right-of-way for 83 hectares of land (P100 per square meter). Remulla said this was overpriced because the land was worth only P6 to P8 per square meter.

    2. The government paid the cost of building the road, which was P170 million. Normally, companies that want to connect a highway to their private properties should pay the government. For example, the cost of building the Mamplasan, Asia Brewery, Greenfield and Southwoods exits on the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) were paid by these companies.

    Most importantly, the farmers were against the road construction from the start. And even though the farmers were the rightful owners of the land, they did not receive the payment of P83 million, or even 33% of it.

    According to Noynoy, 97% of the P83 million was used to pay off debts. The farmers were not aware of these debts.

    Noynoy also denied he had anything to do with the project. He said the issue was being used to tarnish his reputation because he was the leading presidential candidate.

    But Loveland’s testimony was recorded in 2005—several years before Noynoy announced that he would run for president.

    MURDERS AFTER THE LUISITA MASSACRE

    After the Luisita Massacre, the following supporters of Luisita farmers were killed.

    - Marcelino Beltran, a retired army officer turned peasant leader who was about to testify at the Senate and at the Congress.

    - Abel Ladera, Tarlac City councilor, engineer and former sugar mill worker who grew up in the hacienda. Ladera had been actively supporting the farmers and had called for a review of Luisita’s issues.

    - Father William Tadena, an Aglipayan priest who had mobilized his parish to donate rice and groceries regularly to the workers at the picket line.

    - “Tatang” Ben Concepcion, a 67-year-old peasant leader of Anakpawis in Pampanga.

    - Flor Collantes, the secretary-general of Bayan Muna in Tarlac.

    - Ric Ramos, the president of the union of the sugar mill workers. Before Ramos was killed, the Cojuangcos had been claiming that there was no money to pay the workers’ wages and benefits. Ramos asked the Department of Labor and Employent (DOLE) to inspect the Cojuangcos’ warehouse. They found out that it was full of sugar. The DOLE confiscated and sold the sugar and gave the proceeds to the workers.

    - Tirso Cruz, a union leader. Cruz had been leading protests against the construction of the Luisita tollway of the SCTEx.

    - Father Alberto Ramento, Supreme Bishop of the Aglipayan Church, who had been helping the farm workers.

    “HELLO GARCI” AND LUISITA

    Under pressure from public outrage over the Luisita massacre, the Arroyo administration formed Task Force Stock Distribution on November 25, 2004 to study the causes of the workers’ strike. The task force was later renamed Task Force Luisita.

    While the Task Force’s investigation was ongoing, “Hello Garci” hit the country.

    CORY AND NOYNOY DEFEND GLORIA

    In June 2005, tapes of wiretapped phone conversations between President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec official Virgilio Garcillano surfaced. This led to accusations that Arroyo cheated during the 2004 presidential elections.

    Even after Arroyo delivered her famous “I am sorry” speech on TV on June 27, 2005, Cory defended Arroyo, saying: “I am glad the President has broken her silence. Her admission of judgment lapses leading to improper conduct on her part is a truly welcome development. Tonight the President has made a strong beginning and I hope she will continue in the direction of better and more responsive governance.”

    Noynoy said President Arroyo should be praised for admitting her mistake. He said her televised apology was “a good start” for her administration.

    The next day, Cory said Arroyo should not be ousted through unconstitutional means.

    NOYNOY VOTES AGAINST PLAYING GARCI TAPES

    At the fifth Congressional hearing on the Garci issue on June 30, 2005, three days after Arroyo’s “I am sorry” speech, Noynoy voted against playing the “Hello Garci” tapes.

    Anakpawis Rep. Rafael Mariano said Noynoy protected Arroyo because she helped the Cojuangco-Aquinos during the November 2004 strike in Luisita.

    CORY AND NOYNOY DROP GLORIA

    But on July 8, 2005, just a little over a week after Noynoy voted not to play the Garci tapes and Cory praised Arroyo for her “I am sorry” speech, the Aquinos dropped their support for Arroyo.

    “I ask the President to spare our country and herself… and make the supreme sacrifice of resigning,” Cory said.

    The day before, Cory met with President Arroyo in Malacañang. There were rumors of a shouting match, which Cory denied.

    From then on, Cory and Noynoy actively joined the calls for Arroyo to either resign or be impeached.

    LUISITA—WHY THE AQUINOS AND ARROYO BECAME ENEMIES?

    Some Luisita farm workers believe the Aquinos’ abrupt withdrawal of support for Arroyo had something to do with the hacienda.

    The Aquinos broke ties with Arroyo in July 2005, the same month Task Force Luisita submitted the findings and recommendations of its investigation. This formed the basis for the government’s decision a few months later to cancel Luisita’s stock distribution option (SDO) and order the distribution of the hacienda to the farmers.

    GOVERNMENT ORDERS LUISITA DISTRIBUTION

    In December 2005, the government ordered Luisita’s SDO to be cancelled.

    But the Cojuangco-Aquinos would not give up the land without a fight. They obtained a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) from the Supreme Court in 2006, which prevented the government from cancelling the SDO and distributing the land. This TRO has been in force for more than three years now.

    SDO NOW ILLEGAL

    The stock distribution option was abolished in the new land reform law of 2009. But Hacienda Luisita has still not been distributed to the farmers.

    NOYNOY’S CAMPAIGN

    On February 5, 2010, Noynoy said Hacienda Luisita’s problem could not be solved easily even if he became president. He said the reason was that the government could not intervene because the hacienda was a private corporation.

    Four days later, when Noynoy launched his election campaign, he said he would distribute the hacienda to the farmers by June 2014.

    Cory made a similar promise to distribute Hacienda Luisita when she was running for president, but she broke her promise.

    Danilo Ramos of the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) said, “Why wait for 2014 when they can relinquish their immoral and unlawful control of Hacienda Luisita anytime today, tomorrow or next week?”

    BANK LOANS

    Noynoy said the reason why the land could not be distributed sooner was the hacienda’s debts. Certain portions of the hacienda had been mortgaged by the Cojuangcos when losses were suffered by the company.

    One of the lawyers of the farmers said the farmers were not aware of these loans and did not benefit from them. Therefore, it was unfair to force them to shoulder the burden of these debts.

    A MATTER OF SINCERITY

    Anakpawis Rep. Rafael Mariano said that if the Cojuangco-Aquino family were sincere about distributing the land, they should immediately cancel the petition they filed in 2006, which prevented and continues to prevent the distribution of the hacienda to the farmers.

    STILL NO JUSTICE FOR MASSACRE AND MURDER VICTIMS

    To this day, the victims of the Mendiola Massacre, Luisita Massacre and Luisita-related murders have not received justice.

    GMANEWS.TV SPECIAL REPORTS
    Hacienda Luisita’s past haunts Noynoy’s future
    Cory’s land reform legacy to test Noynoy’s political will
    How a workers’ strike became the Luisita Massacre
    After Luisita massacre, more killings linked to protest

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